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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




QIAO LIN WANG, 
                                             Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                                                                        Respondent
___________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A200-039-864 
Immigration Judge:  Eugene Pugliese
__________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 11, 2010
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.





Qiao Lin Wang petitions this Court to review a final order of removal issued by the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied her
Wang and her husband were subsequently married in the United States.          1
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application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”).  The BIA dismissed her appeal.  For the reasons set forth
below, we will grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order, and remand to the
BIA for further proceedings.
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential
facts.  Wang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, entered the United
States in Brownsville, Texas, on July 26, 2005.  The Immigration and Naturalization
Service served her with a notice to appear charging her as inadmissable pursuant to
section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides that “[a]n
alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the
United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is
inadmissible.”  Wang conceded the charge and applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the CAT based on China’s family planning policy.  She
moved for, and was granted, a change of venue to Immigration Court in New Jersey.
Wang testified as follows in support of her application at a February 9, 2007
hearing before the IJ.  In 2004, she and her then-boyfriend (hereinafter referred to as her
“husband”)  had a traditional marriage ceremony in China, and the two began living1
together thereafter.  Their marriage was not legally recognized because they were both
3under the minimum marriage ages of twenty (for a woman) and twenty-two (for a man). 
Because Wang and her husband were not lawfully married, their cohabitation was illegal. 
After a neighbor reported their cohabitation to the authorities, family planning officials
required Wang to submit to examinations to determine whether she was pregnant.  A
December 3, 2004 examination revealed that Wang was pregnant, and she was forced to
undergo an abortion that same day.  She was also fined, told that she was not permitted to
have any children for two years, and ordered to return to the hospital to have an
intrauterine device (“IUD”) implanted one month after the abortion.  To avoid the IUD
insertion, Wang went to stay with her aunt in another village.  Wang eventually fled
China for the United States.          
According to Wang’s Form I-589, family planning officials searched for Wang
after she fled.  They spoke with her husband and threatened to sterilize him unless he
informed them of Wang’s whereabouts.  Wang claimed that her husband then lost his job
because family planning officials told his supervisor that he violated the family planning
policy.  Wang alleged that, as a result of these events, her husband joined her when she
left China for the United States.         
In support of her claim, Wang submitted a receipt, dated January 28, 2005,
reflecting payment of a two-thousand yuan fine for being “pregnant without permission.” 
Joint Appendix (“JA”) 198.  She also submitted letters from her father and aunt
corroborating her testimony.  In addition, the IJ entered into the record a copy of the 2005
4State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices for China, which notes that
“to delay childbearing, the law sets the minimum marriage age for women at 20 years and
for men at 22 years.  It continued to be illegal in almost all provinces for a single woman
to have a child.”  JA 115.
The IJ held that Wang failed to meet her burden of proof, primarily because she
did not produce her husband as a corroborating witness.  The IJ also held that Wang was
required to corroborate her testimony that China did not permit unmarried people to
cohabit.  The BIA dismissed Wang’s appeal because “she did not provide corroborative
evidence from her husband, who is a key figure in her asylum claim and a witness to
many of the alleged incidents of past harm.”  JA 3.  The BIA further concluded that
Wang’s CAT claim failed because she had not alleged that she had been tortured.  This
petition for review followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. §
1252.  Our power of review extends to only the BIA’s decision.  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239
F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001).  However, when the BIA adopts the IJ’s findings and
discusses some of the bases for the IJ’s opinion, we review both decisions.  See Xie v.
Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004).  We review legal conclusions de novo. 
Toussaint v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 2006).  We review findings of fact to
determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence; such findings are
5conclusive “unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to arrive at a contrary
conclusion.”  Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted);
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”). 
Furthermore, “[n]o court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with respect
to the availability of corroborating evidence . . . unless the court finds . . . that a
reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is
unavailable.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); see also Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 252 (3d
Cir. 2009).
Asylum allows an alien who is otherwise subject to removal to stay in the United
States because he or she qualifies as a refugee.  Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 188
(3d Cir. 2007).  A refugee is a person who is unable or unwilling to return to his or her
country of nationality because of persecution or a well founded fear of persecution on
account of, inter alia, political opinion.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  “[A] person who has
been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, . . . or has been
persecuted for . . . resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to
have been persecuted on account of political opinion” and a person with a well founded
fear that he or she will be “forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution
for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of
persecution on account of political opinion.”  Id. § 1101(a)(42)(B).  To establish a well
6founded fear of persecution, an applicant must show a subjective fear as well as an
objectively reasonable possibility that he or she would suffer such persecution if returned
to his or her country.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i).
In addition to asylum, Wang sought withholding of removal and relief under the
CAT.  An applicant for withholding of removal must show that there is a “clear
probability that he or she would face persecution if returned to his or her home country.” 
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 n.2 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks
omitted).  To qualify for relief under the CAT, a petitioner must prove that he or she is
more likely than not to be tortured in the country of removal.  Id.
III.
A.
We first address Wang’s argument that the BIA erred in concluding that she failed
to meet her burden of proof due to insufficient corroboration.  The administrative record
contained, inter alia, the following evidence:  1) the receipt reflecting payment of a two-
thousand yuan fine for being “pregnant without permission,” 2) letters from Wang’s
father and aunt, corroborating the events to which she testified, and 3) the State
Department Report establishing that Chinese law sets a minimum marriage age and that in
China it is unlawful for a single woman to have a child.
The IJ denied Wang’s asylum and withholding of removal claims mainly because
her husband did not testify.  With respect to Wang’s husband, the IJ stated “the Court
The exception to this conclusion concerns the IJ’s determination that Wang was2
required to corroborate her testimony that it is unlawful for unmarried couples to cohabit
in China.  The BIA did not adopt this portion of the IJ’s analysis, and so we need not
determine whether this finding constitutes error.  However, we note that we have doubts
as to the reasonableness of requiring Wang to corroborate a fact that is hardly central to
her claim that, as an unmarried pregnant woman, she was subject to a forced abortion and
further persecution.  There is no dispute that Wang was considered unmarried at the
relevant time period, and the record contains evidence supporting the fact that it was
illegal for unmarried women to become pregnant, including the fine receipt for being
7
feels today that that is an essential witness and that he needed to be here today to testify
and to subject himself to cross-examination so that this case could be corroborated.”  JA
34.  The IJ, in his decision, did not mention Wang’s receipt for payment of the fine for
being “pregnant without permission” and dismissed out of hand the corroborating letters
from Wang’s family members because “these letters are from people who are not here . . .
. to be cross-examined in Court.”  JA 34-35.  
The BIA began its analysis by observing that Wang did not provide corroborative
evidence in the form of her husband’s testimony.  It noted that she submitted “a fine
receipt indicating that she paid two thousand yuan for ‘pregnant without permission’ and
letters from her father about her problems with the family planning committee.”  JA 3. 
Then, without further analysis, the BIA determined “[w]e cannot conclude that this
evidence is sufficient to meet her burden of proving . . . that she suffered past
persecution.”  Id. 
It is unclear from this discussion to what extent the BIA relied upon the IJ’s
decision in reaching its own conclusion.   The BIA did not indicate that it affirmed the2
“pregnant without permission,” and the Country Report, which states that “it continued to
be illegal in almost all provinces for a single woman to have a child.”  JA 115, 198.  
We note that the IJ appears to have discounted the letters from Wang’s father and3
aunt solely on the ground that they constitute hearsay.  See JA 34-35 (“[T]hese letters are
from people who are not here . . . to be cross-examined in Court.”).  We have held that an
IJ should not perfunctorily reject evidence simply because of its hearsay nature.  Dia v.
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001).  As noted, we are unable to discern whether
the BIA relied on this portion of the IJ’s analysis.
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IJ’s decisions for the reasons the IJ set forth, and the BIA referred to evidence that the IJ
failed to address in his decision.  However, the BIA did not conduct its own legal analysis
before affirming the IJ’s decision with respect to the corroboration issue.  The BIA did
not explain why the proffered corroboration was insufficient, nor did it include any
discussion that demonstrates that it exercised its duty to analyze the issue.   The BIA’s3
failure to explain the basis for its decision that the corroborating evidence fell short of the
burden of proof makes it impossible for us to review meaningfully that decision.  In such
circumstances, we must vacate the BIA’s decision and remand the matter “so that the BIA
can further explain its reasoning.”  Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir.
2003) (holding that BIA’s generic assertion that petitioner failed to meet his burden of
proof, without further explanation, rendered BIA’s decision unreviewable); see also
Awolesi v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 227, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2003) (“While we give deference to
the decisions of the BIA . . . we cannot give meaningful review to a decision in which the
BIA does not explain how it came to its conclusion.”); Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 555 (vacating
and remanding when the BIA’s failure to explain its rationale made meaningful review
9impossible).  Though we will not generally disturb a decision by the BIA merely because
it could have provided a more in-depth analysis, see Toussaint, 455 F.3d at 414 (quoting
Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 2002)), the agency must at least
sufficiently set forth its “reasoning in a manner that permits a reviewing court to discern
the ‘basis of its decision.’”  Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 212 (3d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Dominguez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 678, 680 (8th Cir. 2003)).  Accordingly, we
will vacate the BIA’s order with respect to Wang’s asylum and withholding claims and
remand in order to give it an opportunity to do so.   
B.
We conclude that the BIA’s CAT analysis suffers from the same deficiencies. 
With respect to Wang’s CAT claim, the BIA stated, “the respondent has not established
that she more likely than not faces ‘torture’ as defined by regulation, upon removal.”  JA
3.  The BIA also noted that Wang had not claimed to have been tortured in the past, nor
did she assert that she would face torture upon return to China.  It appears that the BIA
failed to consider whether Wang’s allegations of coercive family planning practices in
China constituted a claim of torture, but it is impossible for us to know with any certainty
what the BIA’s rationale was without further explanation.  Thus, we will vacate the BIA’s
order regarding Wang’s CAT claim and remand.   
C.
The Attorney General argues that the Abdulai test does not apply to post-REAL4
ID Act cases.  Att’y Gen. Br. at 16.  However, we have already held that “the REAL ID
Act does not change our rules regarding the IJ’s duty to develop the applicant’s
testimony, and in particular, to develop it in accord with the Abdulai steps.”  Chukwu,
484 F.3d at 192.
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In light of our decision to remand for further proceedings, we provide the
following guidance to the BIA.  
Before concluding that an applicant’s claim fails for lack of corroboration, an IJ is
required to conduct the following three-part inquiry:  (1) identify the facts for which it is
reasonable to expect corroboration; (2) determine whether the applicant has corroborated
those facts; and if not, (3) analyze whether the applicant has adequately explained his or
her failure to provide the corroboration.  Sandie, 562 F.3d at 252-53 (citing Abdulai, 239
F.3d at 554).   “Additionally, the IJ must give the applicant notice of what aspects of the4
applicant’s testimony need corroboration.  If the applicant cannot produce corroborating
evidence, the IJ must also afford the applicant an opportunity to explain why.”  Id. at 253. 
The IJ did not engage in this inquiry and neither did the BIA.  In these circumstances, we
are required to vacate the BIA’s decision and remand for further analysis.  Toure v. Att’y
Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 323-24 (3d Cir. 2006); Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 555.  
The first step in the three-part inquiry requires the IJ to identify the specific facts
for which corroboration was sought.  Rather than explaining which of the facts Wang
alleged required corroborating proof, the IJ here simply required Wang’s husband’s
appearance.  See Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554 (finding error for failure to articulate “what
11
particular aspects of Abdulai’s testimony it would have been reasonable to expect him to
corroborate” (emphasis in original)).  On remand, the BIA should be mindful of the
distinction between identifying specific aspects of an applicant’s testimony that require
corroboration and demanding the appearance of a particular witness.  Furthermore, the
BIA should consider whether Wang was given notice of which specific facts needed
corroboration, as well as whether she was given an opportunity to explain her failure to
provide corroborating proof.  See Sandie, 562 F.3d at 253.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Wang’s petition, vacate the BIA’s
decision, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
